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ABSTRACT 
Using panel data pertaining to large Polish (non-financial) firms this paper examines the
determinants of employment change during the period 1996-2002. Paying particular attention to
the asymmetry hypothesis we investigate the impact of own wages, outside wages, output
growth, regional characteristics and sectoral affiliation on the evolution of employment. 
In keeping with the ‘right to manage’ model we find that employment dynamics are not affected
negatively by alternative wages. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the early transition period, we find evidence that employment levels
respond to positive sales growth (in all but state firms). The early literature, (e.g. Kőllő, 1998)
found that labour hoarding lowered employment elasticities in the presence of positive demand
shocks. Our findings suggest that inherited labour hoarding may no longer be a factor.  
We argue that the present pattern of employment adjustment is better explained by the role of
insiders. This tentative conclusion is hinged on the contrasting behaviour of state and privatised
companies and the similar behaviour of privatised and new private companies. We conclude that
lower responsiveness of employment to both positive and negative changes in revenue in state
firms is consistent with the proposition that rent sharing by insiders is stronger in the state sector.
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3INTRODUCTION
In a macroeconomic context characterised by 5% economic growth but 20% unemployment
(Poland, 2004, 1st quarter) the issue of employment determination assumes particular importance.
Using detailed firm level panel data relating to large Polish firms between 1996 and 2002, we
concentrate on examining potential micro determinants of employment growth in Poland. We
motivate our investigation with reference both to the existing economics literature on firm
behaviour as well as to the  Polish context. Research in the early years of transition reflected the
view that state firms, faced by soft budget constraints, would not be willing to eliminate the
excessive levels of labour hoarding inherited from the socialist period, and hence the quantity
side of the labour market would exhibit inertia. Add to this the fact that employees held actual or
effective control rights to many enterprises and the expectation of insider dominated outcomes
was of particular concern. In this context, the observed enterprise adjustments that did occur were
viewed by some as surprising. Firms did respond to output shocks by downsizing labour and
wages. These adjustments reflected the imposition of hard budget constraints, across all
ownership groups.
As the privatisation process has become embedded and the industrial structure more
consolidated, later research (Grosfeld and Nivet, 1997) has pointed to considerable heterogeneity
in enterprise responses. Indeed, behaviour has been described as being dependent on ownership,
firm size, local labour market conditions and the nature of ‘shock’ experienced. Still more recent
research has developed certain of these themes further (Christev and Fitzroy, 2002).
4We draw on, but extend, the existing literature and provide an updated account of the micro
foundations of labour demand and the evolving structure of corporate governance in Poland. Our
contribution is fourfold. First, we take a new and robust approach to capturing the important
heterogeneity among firms’ responses to output shocks and relate this to several characteristics of
interest. Second, we provide new evidence regarding the persistence of insider influence. Third,
in using more recent data, we are able to comment on the continuation or otherwise of a variety
of ‘stylised facts’ emerging from the earlier literature and, in so doing, provide a contemporary
insight into the determinants of labour demand in large Polish firms. Finally, we hint at an
alternative interpretation of the role of outside options and surmise that location may play a
subtler role than that reflected simply in the local labour market.
We find that a) previous employment and internal wage levels influence current employment in
the anticipated way; b) the asymmetrical effects on employment of positive and negative shocks,
found in earlier empirical studies disappear, suggesting that inherited labour hoarding is no
longer a general problem; c) revenue growth is positively related to employment growth in both
privatised and new private firms but not among state firms – pointing towards the persistence of
insider power in such firms; d) similarly, employment sensitivity to negative revenue shocks is
lower in the state sector e) the development of the regional infrastructure is positively associated
with employment growth, suggesting a different interpretation of the effects of standard outside
regional variables may be necessary.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides an outline review of the most relevant literature.
Section 3 describes our econometric approach. In section 4, following a discussion of the data,
5we detail our various empirical specifications. Section 5 presents the results and relates them to
our central hypotheses and section 6 concludes the paper. 
1. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
2.1. Theoretical framework
There is a long history of both theoretical and empirical literature relating to aspects of
employment behaviour in various categories of enterprise, in various countries, at various times.
The transition process has provided a new and fertile ground for such studies. In this section we
reflect briefly on the literature most relevant to our investigation. In doing this we motivate a
series of testable hypotheses and provide a context within which to understand our findings1.
Our main focus in this paper is on the link between corporate control characteristics and the
employment behaviour of firms. This can be analysed within the context of at least three different
theoretical models. We elaborate on them briefly below though make no claim to testing
differences between the models.2 Rather, for our purposes, they motivate parallel conclusions
regarding the possible indicators of insiders’ positions within an empirical framework of
employment equations.
First, the issue of ‘insider control’ can be analysed within the classical framework of the
literature on employee control (Ward (1958); Vanek (1970); Ireland and Law (1982)). This is a
well-rehearsed literature arguing that firms dominated by insiders have low employment
responsiveness to product demand shocks. Indeed, the labour managed firm always varies
                                                          
1 Appendix 1 summarises the key literature.
2 For a good and accessible discussion of the problems relating to  empirically testing employment determination
models, see Booth (1995).
6employment “by a smaller amount in response to given price changes than do their capitalist
counterparts” (Laidler and Estrin, 1989). Given the extent, to which state firms have been
controlled by insiders in both the late socialist period and in the transition period, we expect to
observe either employee control or at least the strong position of employees in the bargaining
process and hence potentially lower employment adjustments to output changes3. In addition, in
cases where subsequent privatisations and reforms haven’t sufficiently modified the internal
control structures, we may expect those effects to prevail after privatisation. From this point of
view, using new private firms as a benchmark is an important empirical test.
Second, the employee ownership models can be easily incorporated as a limiting case of more
recent ‘efficient contract’ models, best exemplified by the seminal paper of Brown and
Ashenfelter (1986). In this class of models bargaining is always related to both wages and
employment and full insider control relates to the case, in which all bargaining strength lies with
labour. In addition, Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) developed three alternative scenarios derived
from the impact of internal and external wages on employment. If the alternative wage acts as the
sole determinant of employment, the employment contract is said to be strongly efficient4. That
is, employment is set so as to equate the marginal revenue product of workers with the alternative
wage. When both the internal and alternative wage are significant (negative) determinants of
employment, employment determination is characterised as ‘weakly efficient’. If only the internal
wage is instrumental in determining employment, the outcome is consistent with a third
theoretical model, that is, one of monopolistic price setting by the union and unilateral
                                                          
3 Earle and Estrin (1996) and Köllo (1998) offer a good discussion of the insiders’ control model in the context of
transition economies.
4 It can be traced back to the efficient bargaining model by Leontief (1946).
7employment setting by the employer (i.e. the ‘right to manage’ model) 5. In this case employment
will be lower than under efficient contracts. Brown and Ashenfelter test these hypotheses using
US data for the period 1948-65, and are unable to reject the hypothesis that contracts are ‘weakly
efficient’ but not ‘strongly efficient’. 
In merging the ‘right to manage’ model and the efficient contract model, Oswald (1993) offers a
critique. He argues that, to the extent that unions are likely to focus on wages in the bargaining
process rather than on the combination of employment and wages, it is perfectly plausible that
‘efficient’ bargaining may produce outcomes consistent with the ‘right to manage’ outcome. 
On a related theme, an interesting implication stemming from Oswald’s (1993) analysis, and
consistent with insider ownership/control is that the employment response may be weak or even
negative in response to a positive demand shock. That is, we expect to observe asymmetry of
outcomes in response to positive and negative demand shocks. The underlying motivation for the
asymmetry hypothesis can be traced back to Lindbeck and Snower (1987) yet, in the context of
the transition economies, asymmetry has a specific interpretation. In particular, asymmetry may
be suggestive of inherited labour hoarding. In other words, because of existing labour reserves,
employment is inelastic with respect to an increase in sales, but not with respect to a decrease.
Even without inherited labour hoarding, weak or even negative upward output elasticity of
                                                          
5 Under this framework a union chooses a wage rate constrained by demand for its member’s labour and, as argued
by Dunlop (1944), equilibria lie on the labour demand curve. It has been termed a monopoly union as its
introduction into a competitive labour market would lead to a deadweight loss usually associated with monopoly
(Currie, 1991, p.46).
8employment remains consistent with the insider hypothesis. More generally, in the absence of an
‘insiders effect’ and without inherited labour hoarding we expect to observe symmetry.6
We reiterate that it is not our intention to subject these theories to testing here7. Nevertheless, to
understand and interpret our results it pays to keep in mind that alternative models of bargaining
can produce similar testable hypotheses. From our point of view, two critical tests come from the
fact that /i/ we expect employment to be less responsive in insider dominated companies, and /ii/
if, additionally, there is still asymmetry in response to negative and positive shocks, this can be
viewed  as an indicator that the legacy of socialist labour hoarding may still impact upon firm
behaviour.
2.2. Empirical findings
As appendix 1 illustrates, the early empirical evidence from the transition countries is strongly
suggestive of negative wage elasticity of employment (to a declining degree as transition
progresses) but there is little clear evidence relating to the outside option. For Poland, Basu et al.
(2000) find own wage elasticity of –0.84 immediately after transition began; Grosfeld and Nivet
present a figure of between –0.03 and –0.13 for the years 1988 – 1994; and Christev and Fitzroy
(2002), using later data from 1994-1997, find wage elasticity of –0.08. For Hungary, Köllö
(1998) finds elasticity declining from –0.6 to –0.3 by the start of transition. Körösi (2002),
                                                          
6 Indeed, Haskel et al., (1997) study asymmetry in the UK. They find that employment adjustment is more common
in times of a positive demand shock, as compared to a negative demand shock. Thus, there is evidence of asymmetry,
but reversed as compared to transition economies.
7 For a thorough discussion of the theoretical models, see for instance Layard et al. (1991) and Booth (1995).
9covering the period 1992-1999 for Hungary, finds that, in the initial years of transition, labour
demand was much more responsive to own wages but by 1999 characteristics of employment
adjustment in Hungarian firms, had converged on that of their Western counterparts. In sum, the
literature suggests that own-wage elasticity coefficients  peaked in the early transition period.  
  
As witnessed by the growing body of research examining the relationship between ownership,
control and employment patterns the issue of insider control manifestly relates to that of
ownership. Konings et al. (1996) find evidence that, in the early transition period (i.e. pre 1991),
new private firms, in which insiders are hypothesised to be less influential, contributed
significantly to Polish job growth. Basu et al. (2000) and Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) did not find
significant differences in employment behaviour for different ownership sectors in the early
transition period in Poland (i.e. 1990-1991), but importantly, in neither case, were new firms
identified. Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) offer an explanation for the absence of differences between
privatised and state firms. Specifically, half of the privatised enterprises in their sample held an
explicit commitment to keep employment levels stable during the first 1.5-3 years post-
privatisation. This suggests the need to examine more recent behaviour. 
Faggio and Konings (2003) examine job creation, destruction and employment growth in five
transition economies: Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Estonia, with firm level panel
data from a similar period, i.e. 1993-97. They find that, in Poland and Romania, state ownership
has a negative effect on employment growth in comparison with firms under majority private
10
domestic ownership, and that large firms in more advanced transition economies downsized
faster than in the laggards.8
2.2.1 Empirical findings on asymmetry
Estrin and Svenjar (1998) and Kőllő (1998) investigate this asymmetry hypothesis by looking at
employment growth differences among firms experiencing/not experiencing declining real sales.
Based on data from the early transition period (1986-9, 1989-2 and 1992-3) Kőllő finds that the
elasticity of labour demand is relatively high for firms with decreasing output (0.2-0.3), yet
insignificant for those with increasing output. This is a finding consistent with the inherited
labour surplus hypothesis. Moreover the relationship between output and employment became
stronger over time, especially for privatised firms (Ibidem, p.92 and 100). Estrin and Svenjar
(1998), using firm level data from 1988-1993 for Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and
Hungary, also test the asymmetry hypothesis. Their results reveal that employment responded to
both decreasing and increasing sales, but that the response was higher for firms with increasing
sales: 0.36-0.44 as opposed to 0.12-0.35. 
Christev and Fitzroy (2002) focus on Polish firms for a later period (1994 – 1997) than that
covered by the above studies. They estimate an equation in first differences using GMM
Arellano-Bond (1991) methods and split the variables for positive and negative growth of output.
They find that employment growth responds only to decreasing sales and offer the interpretation
that inherited labour hoarding persisted among Polish firms in that period. It is worth noting
                                                          
8 Papers on other transition countries, discussing ownership cross sections include Konings et al. (2003) on Ukraine,
Rutkowski (2002) on Croatia, Brown and Earle (2002) and Konings and Lehmann (2001) on Russia, Dong (1988)
and Lee (1999) on China.  See summary in appendix 1.
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however, that the sample of these authors’ did not include de novo firms, in which labour
hoarding should not be observed. On the other hand, they find that state owned enterprises are
characterised by a far smaller significant response to negative shocks than either the firms
privatised to outsiders or firms included in the National Investment Funds programme. Again,
this finding would appear to be consistent with insiders’ control.
Similar results were obtained by Kőrősi (2002), who estimated labour demand equations
annually for the period 1992–1999 for medium and large Hungarian firms. Interestingly, when
the sample is restricted first to manufacturing firms, and second to engineering firms alone, the
difference in employment response between firms with increasing and decreasing output seems
to disappear in the most recent period. Accounting for sectoral differences may be important in
so far as sectoral heterogeneity masks certain underlying trends, such as the fact that the impact
of initial labour hoarding may be decreasing over time9. 
Finally, size may also matter. Typically, smaller firms were more likely to be privatised and new
companies are smaller by design at least in the early period. This implies a correlation between
size and ownership, which may affect the robustness of conclusions. Several studies tackle this
issue directly. Kőllő (1998) controls for small and large firms. His results for Hungarian firms
reveal that small firms are characterised by stronger employment growth. Similarly, Faggio and
Konings (2003) report a clear relationship between employment growth and initial size: larger
firms are negatively associated with employment growth. Christev and Fitzroy (2002) include a
                                                          
9 This does present a potential empirical problem in the short run. While sectoral affiliation is a binary indicator, the
real processes are continuous in character. The transition trend towards ‘tertiarisaiton’ likely relates to most post-
socialist manufacturing companies without necessarily being reflected in sectoral statistics. 
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variable to represent average firm size and find that larger firms tend to grow more slowly. As
our sample is drawn from the largest Polish firms, extrapolation of our results to small firms
should be viewed cautiously. 
So, what lessons can be culled from this literature to inform our examination of the employment
behaviour of large Polish firms? First, if employees attach significant weight to wages in the
bargaining process then we should observe a negative correlation between employment and
internal wages and thus can reject the ‘strong efficiency hypothesis’. Second, if insiders maintain
control over firms, we will observe low responsiveness of employment to final output. Third,
since low upwards employment elasticity is also consistent with the labour hoarding story, it is
both (i) low downwards elasticity and (ii) low upwards employment elasticity, which are
indicative of a strong insider domination, in contrast with a situation, where only the latter holds.
Finally, as a consequence of weak insider effects alongside an absence of residual labour
hoarding, de novo enterprises should exhibit a positive association between output and
employment growth. 
2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DATA
3.1 Data
This study is based on data procured from publicly available company level information relating
to Poland’s largest companies. The data is sourced from a project (with participation of one of
the co-authors), financed by the Polish Committee for Scientific Research (grant 1H02C-024-
19)10 and utilises all publicly available information on Poland’s largest companies. Information is
                                                          
10 Other results of the project are available in an edited volume in Polish (Baltowski, 2002).
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sourced from the Warsaw Stock Exchange and several lists of the 500 largest (revenue)
companies published by journals and magazines, including Rzeczpospolita, Polityka, Gazeta
Bankowa, Nowe Zycie Gospodarcze, Zycie Gospodarcze and Businessman. Ultimately, the
veracity of the information used is verified and corrected in line with the companies’ annual
reports - now accessible in most cases. Our panel of firms is unbalanced since, inevitably, there
are missing values for certain companies, in certain years. In addition, to limit the impact of
potential measurement error, we eliminate 0.5% of observations in each tail of our key
variables.11 
Apart from standard type errors, there were several other noteworthy problems encountered
during data processing. In principle, Polish state companies were prevented from buying shares
in other privatised companies. In reality, this applied neither to privatisations (or semi-
privatisations) resulting from bank-led restructuring programmes, nor to post-privatisation
ownership transfers including, for instance, companies privatised via the National Investment
Funds programme. As a consequence, a number of ‘privatised’ companies are wrongly attributed
to the private sector rather than to the state sector. These cases are not necessarily easy to detect,
due to the multi-layered nature of cross-company ownership, but the data has been corrected
where possible. On a related theme there are problems with distinguishing the dominant
ownership class from minority owner groups. There are also cases of companies being wrongly
classified as ‘de novo’ private companies, either because they have been formally registered as a
                                                          
11 On inspection, the observations in the tails cannot be explained other than as measurement errors. Typically, the
inclusion of outliers makes rejecting the null hypotheses easier and inflates the coefficients upwards. These results
are available from the authors on request.
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new company as part of the privatisation proceedings, or because they are new companies created
by other state-controlled firms. The former case relates in particular to companies privatised
through employee buy-outs (see Mickiewicz and Baltowski, 2003). We are also aware of the fact
that some sources do not distinguish between individual companies and consolidated balances of
capital groups with similar names. Compiling both categories into one time series would create a
serious data distortion.
 
In keeping with the literature we choose to use aggregate price indices to transform nominal
series. In particular, following Christev and Fitzroy (2002) and Currie (1991) we use CPI since,
arguably, use of PPI at sectoral level would erase some of the effects we are particularly
interested in. Thus, while using the aggregate price index, we do not eliminate the impact of
shifts in relative sectoral prices on total revenue. This is important because we wish the change in
revenue to incorporate the impact of sectoral demand for the final product. 
The construction of the ownership cross-section is far from straightforward and no approach is
exempt from criticism. Though it is straightforward to identify de novo firms, since by definition
they are a time invariant category, problems arise as soon as we begin to construct ownership
indicators for privatised versus state companies. To reduce potential endogeneity, one approach
could be to use pre-sample information on ownership to partition the data and hence treat
ownership as time invariant. However, in most cases, future information pertaining to ownership
was available in pre-sample time and it has been well established that the privatisation processes
impacted upon firm behaviour prior to the formal privatisation date.12 This being so, treating
                                                          
12 See Megginson and Netter (2001) for further discussion on methodology.
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ownership as pre-determined is unlikely to remove any potential endogeneity and a better option
could be to distinguish between those companies, privatised during the period in question and
those which were not. Yet, even then, some companies in the state group might again expect
privatisation after the sample period and the impact of future expectation is not eliminated. In our
specifications we utilise time variant dummy variables for our state and privatised categories, but
note that estimates based on alternative ownership specifications, in line with those described
above, do not affect the key results.
An appealing feature of our data is that, through the details concerning company and location, we
are able to match the enterprises with corresponding administrative units and subsequently with
appropriate regional labour market indicators, available from the Polish Central Statistical Office.
We also adopt the public infrastructure indices, developed by Duffy and Walsh (2001) that rank
voivodships according to six infrastructure indicators.13 However, assigning companies to
regions created its own methodological challenges. 25% of the companies included in the sample
are registered in Warsaw. These can be considered in two sub-categories: companies operating
nation-wide, and those whose operations are located in the capital city. 9% of companies,
typically in manufacturing production, are in the latter category. The remaining enterprises
registered in Warsaw (16% of the sample) we consider to be nation-wide, typically consisting of
trade companies and retail network firms, but also producers with several major sites. We
attribute national averages of the relevant labour market indicators in the case of those companies
labelled nation-wide.
                                                          
13 These indicators relate to the number of telephones, fax machines, railways and public roads in the region as well
as the urban share of the population and the share of services in total regional employment. 
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The above caveats aside our firm level data is relatively rich and concentrates on the largest
Polish firms. We have reliable information on employment levels, wage levels, total earnings,
ownership status and the sector of activity supplemented with information on regional wages,
sectoral wages, unemployment and public infrastructure. Appendix 2 provides full variable
definitions while Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables.
{Table 1 about here}
Interestingly, in terms of both revenue and employment dynamics, the performance of state
companies is superior to their privatised counterparts possibly as a result of post-privatisation
restructuring. The main difference however seems to be between these two groups and de novo
firms, for which the growth of both employment and output is high, and the difference with the
two other categories is highly significant. It is also worth noting that for the state firms, the
distribution of the percentage change in employment seems to have more mass in the centre, as
compared with the other categories. This is illustrated by lower absolute values at  both the 25th
and 75th percentiles. Thus, even at this preliminary stage of analysis we  detect lower
responsiveness of employment levels in state sector firms. The pattern related to the quality of
infrastructure in a firms locality is not clear cut. Interestingly however, companies operating
nation-wide exhibit better performance than the rest of the sample, in terms of both employment
and revenue dynamics. 
3.2  Econometric Techniques and Specification
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To explore the hypotheses outlined above we employ generalised method of moments techniques
(GMM). In their seminal paper, Arellano and Bond (1991) find that GMM is superior to
instrumental variable estimators and recommend one step GMM for inference (Ibidem, p.293).
More recently, Judson and Owen (1999) support the conclusion that this estimation method is
superior to feasible alternatives for unbalanced panels with a short time dimension. The GMM
estimator is robust in that it does not require information pertaining to the exact distribution of
the disturbances and is instrumental in combating the problems associated with potential
endogeneity. The estimator allows for the endogeneity of all regressors by using predetermined
variables as efficient instruments. In essence, this model involves estimation in differenced form
of the general distributed-lag model. 
We have made several informed choices in our specification of the model and comment upon
these briefly. Firstly, following Arellano-Bond methodology, we transformed variables into first
(logarithmic) differences to alleviate possible problems relating to individual fixed effects.
Secondly, in view of the relatively small sample size, we adopt a conservative approach in our
choice of ownership categories. We focus our attention on the three ownership categories – state,
privatised and de novo – described in appendix 2. Our key indicator of the enterprises financial
position is the revenue growth experienced by the firm – a variable we interact in various ways to
investigate the hypotheses outlined in the previous section.
We estimate the following basic specification:
)1(__
_sec___1
ittTitSitOitwageregionalreal
itwagetoralrealitrevenuerealitwagerealitemploymentitemployment
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Z
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where Oit, Sit and Tit relate to ownership, sectoral and time controls respectively and Z is a matrix
of interactive effects with a corresponding column vector of coefficients γ. As the variables are
first-differenced, the inclusion of sectoral controls is not a necessity, as individual unobservable
effects are taken care of, however we follow here the practice of some other researchers (Christev
and FitzRoy (2002) in particular).
We estimate equation (1) without ownership and interactive effects and report our results in
column 1, Table 2. Specification (2) introduces the first ownership test by interacting both
revenue growth and wage growth with the dummy for state ownership. In the specifications (3)-
(7), we drop the wage interactive term and introduce a differential slope coefficient, taking the
value 0 for firms with positive revenue growth and the actual value of the negative revenue
change for the remaining firms. This specification enables an initial test for signs of asymmetry.
This term is then interacted with ownership dummies to further explore dimensions of
asymmetry. That is, we are able to investigate the asymmetry hypothesis without dividing the
sample into sub-groups. We then modify the composition of outside controls to obtain
specifications (3)-(7). Specifically, specification (4) omits  sectoral wages; specification (5)
introduces regional infrastructure effects, including a dummy variable for firms operating in
multiple locations; specification (6) retains the infrastructure controls at the expense of regional
wages; and specification (7) retains the dummy for multiple location, drops the other
infrastructure dummies and reintroduces a control for the regional wage. Finally we carry out
two additional tests. Specification (8) introduces differential effects for de novo firms, enabling
us to detect differential slope coefficients for all three ownership groups and  to assess the
difference between new private firms and privatised firms, in addition to the difference between
19
the state sector and the aggregate private sector. Specification (9) retains controls and interactive
effects for both state and de novo firms, but eliminates variables relating to asymmetry. In short,
(9) is a specification similar to the basic specification (2), but distinguishing between all three
ownership groups, to establish whether our focus on the private-state nexus was justified.
4. RESULTS
As expected, the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant, with the corresponding
coefficient taking values between 0.22 and 0.29 in alternative specifications. This result reflects a
somewhat smaller effect than Christev and Fitzroy (2002) who cover similar firms in an earlier
period and obtain an estimated coefficient of 0.7 on lagged employment growth. Both cases
suggest that employment growth is path dependent and that the empirical approach taken is
therefore appropriate. The internal wage is negatively significant with a coefficient varying
narrowly between –.57 and -.60 across the specifications. Higher internal wage growth is
associated with lower employment growth and the ‘strong efficiency’ hypothesis is clearly
rejected. The size of the effect is higher than that found by both Christev and Fitzroy  (2002) and
Grosfeld and Nivet (1997), but lower than that found by Basu et al. (2000). Turning to outside
options we find that sectoral wages and regional wages are positive but that only the latter are
significant14. According to the ‘weak efficiency’ hypothesis the outside wage available to
workers should be negatively related to employment change but, just as Brown and Ashenfelter
(1986) found it “frequently positively related to employment” so too do we. It would seem to be
the case that higher regional wages may reflect some factor other than the bargaining relations of
firms and employees. This is a theme to which we return later. In terms of total revenue change
                                                          
14 We also experimented with a regional unemployment measure but found that to be highly insignificant.
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we find a positive relationship with employment change, suggesting that output expansions are
being transformed into employment growth as opposed to only wage growth. For the whole
sample (Table 2, specification (1)), the output elasticity of employment is 0.28, which is entirely
consistent with other studies for both Poland and Hungary (Basu et al. (2000), Kőllő (1998),
Grosfeld and Nivet (1997)).
We turn now to ownership effects. The ownership dummies reveal that, compared to privatised
and de novo firms, state sector firms have significantly lower employment growth, and the result
is consistent across the specifications. This is as we would expect. On the other hand, we are
unable to detect any effect related to the difference between de novo and privatised firms (Table
3, specifications (8) and (9)).
The sectoral controls point towards higher employment growth in the utilities sector and lower
employment growth for the mining & heavy industry and construction sectors. We have
particular confidence in the robustness of these results since not only are they consistent across
specifications but they are also based on orthogonal contrasts rather than reflecting simple
sectoral dummies. In particular, the poor performance of employment in the mining and heavy
industry sector is consistent with the prior knowledge.
In specification (2) we add additional controls, interacting state ownership with both the own
wage and total revenue. The results demonstrate the existence of clearly differing dynamics
depending on ownership status. The negative association of the state/revenue interactive term
shows that revenue growth in state firms translates into far lower employment growth than in
other firms. This is consistent with either an interpretation of excess ‘inherited labour’ or of
insiders appropriating rent in the form of wages as enterprise revenues grow. The latter
explanation garners support from the fact that wage increases in state firms are more weakly
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associated with employment declines  than is the case for other firms15. Taken together these two
findings imply some element of ‘insider control’ in state firms.
Table 3 reports the results of our investigation of the asymmetry hypothesis. In specification (3),
we estimate a version of specification (1) with the inclusion of a differential slope coefficient
identifying the level of revenue change among firms experiencing declines in revenue. We also
interact this term with the state sector dummy. We find the former coefficient to be negative but
insignificant, suggesting that for negative revenue growth firms, the employment with respect to
sales elasticity is lower than that predicted by the aggregate relationship incorporating the
positive revenue growth firms. This is indicative of a general asymmetry effect – namely that
employment is more responsive upwards than downwards – though the general asymmetry effect
appears weak. This is potentially important since it diverges from the findings of earlier periods.
For example, Christev and Fitzroy (2002) find that sales increases have little effect on
employment growth whereas employment does respond to falling sales. Similar results were
obtained by Kőllő (1998) for the early transition period in Hungary. For the early transition
period, this was interpreted as evidence of high levels of initial labour hoarding enabling firms to
expand output without increasing employment. In so far as such an interpretation is correct, our
findings go some way to establishing that the initial ‘widespread labour hoarding’ may be over.
Hence, when firms experience a positive demand shock they are inclined to adjust their labour
force accordingly. It is only in the state sector, where output elasticity is generally dramatically
lower, that we still observe the response to output decline being stronger than that to the output
increase. But even in state sector firms, the difference is no longer significant. To see if our
                                                          
15 .It should be noted however that this differential effect is marginally insignificant.
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conclusions are robust we experiment with alternative sets of outside options in specifications
(3)-(7) and find that our asymmetry results hold.
In specification (8) we introduce additional effects for de novo firms. Output elasticity of
employment is stronger in privatised companies than in de novo companies where the output
growth is positive, but the differences between the two groups are not significant. It is interesting
to contrast that conclusion with the analysis based on descriptive statistics presented earlier. The
highly significant and positive difference in the employment growth of de novo firms compared
with other sectors, vanishes once we subject it to a multivariate approach and control for
endogeneity using the GMM Arellano-Bond framework. Once more, the main difference is that
for state firms with positive employment growth, the increase in employment for a given change
in revenue is lower than for other firms. Taken together, this implies that expanding firms do
indeed turn revenue growth into higher employment but that state firms do so at a lesser rate. In
comparison, negative revenue growth per se does not imply anything for employment growth but
again, among state owned firms, negative revenue growth is associated with lower employment
elasticities compared with other sectors. 
Christev and Fitzroy (2002), separating their sample into firms with positive and negative sales
growth, conclude that there is no evidence of a ‘significant positive employment response to
positive sales growth’. This is taken as evidence of continuing labour hoarding. Our results offer
a more optimistic interpretation of the progress of enterprise restructuring in Poland. In particular
our more recent data reveals clear evidence that a strong positive response to revenue growth has
emerged in large Polish firms, yet  only in the private sector. For state owned firms the effect is
significantly weaker and close to zero. That is, outside of state owned firms, labour hoarding is
no longer a significant impediment to employment growth. In addition, state firms with negative
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revenue growth also exhibit lower employment elasticities than the aggregate suggests. The latter
observation is in line with Christev and Fitzroy (2002) who find that ‘state owned enterprises
exhibit the smallest significant response to negative shocks’. But generally, we find no significant
evidence of asymmetry between firms experiencing negative as opposed to positive revenue
growth, regardless of the ownership sector. Somewhat surprisingly, in the aggregate, it no longer
fits the ‘transition model’. 
In fact, we find that, employment responds positively to revenue growth but less strongly to
revenue falls and so is already more in keeping with western economic models (e.g. Haskel et al,
1997). Notwithstanding this, elements of an ‘unreformed’ state sector still persist. State firms,
whether experiencing expanding revenues or otherwise, exhibit lower employment elasticities
than all firms. This result hints at alternative interpretations. First, it is consistent with sustained
or consolidated insider (employee) control, where firms are less likely to raise employment in
response to positive shocks and to lay off workers when faced with negative shocks.
Alternatively, assuming that some labour hoarding was still present in state companies, an
increase in revenue may help the companies to cover the costs of redundancies while, in the
absence of growth, labour shedding is not possible. 
Table 3 also contains potentially important results concerning outside options. Consistent with a
series of empirical studies stretching back to Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) the coefficient for
regional wages is positive and significant across our specifications. The reasons for this
persistent result have not been explicitly identified to date. One possible explanation is that the
regional wage may be a proxy for some alternative characteristic of the regional economy
associated with firm growth. To investigate whether the variable reflects regional economic
performance we experimented by including a regional unemployment variable but found this to
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be consistently insignificant. Hence, as a first stab at investigating this important issue we
include regional infrastructure variables in specifications (5) and (6). Not only are our other
findings robust to this variation but we find evidence that firms in regions with the best public
infrastructure have higher levels of employment growth. This is clearly of interest to policy
makers. On a related issue, firms operating in multiple regions also outperform other firms. The
latter finding may partially reflect a firms propensity to locate multiple branches rationally and
related efficiency gains, which are transformed into employment generation.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Using data from a panel of large Polish firms, covering a longer and later period than other
studies (e.g. Grosfeld and Nivet (1997), Basu et al., (2000) and Christev and Fitzroy (2002)) we
make a series of interesting and important findings concerning firm employment behaviour. Not
only does our data enable us to investigate employment determination further into the transition
period but also allows us to identify de novo companies, which by the late 1990’s were already
appearing among Poland’s largest firms. 
First, we find that employment is affected by internal wages and not external wages. This may
reflect monopoly price setting unions and unilateral employment setting by the employer (Brown
and Ashenfelter, 1986), regardless of the ownership sector.
Second, as far as the asymmetry hypothesis is concerned, our results differ form earlier studies
such as Kőllő (1998) and Christev and Fitzroy (2002). We find that firms no longer only respond
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to a decline in real total revenue, but to a positive demand shock too, suggesting that the earlier
residual labour hoarding is now over.
 
Third, it is clear in all specifications that firm performance (measured as growth in real total
revenue16) translates into employment growth. Similarly, poor performance (negative real output
growth) is accompanied by lower elasticity of employment, but the difference between positive
and negative growth is not significant. 
The most compelling result of our analysis is that state sector firms exhibit far lower output
elasticities of employment than firms in the private sector. In the case of positive output growth,
the employment elasticity oscillates around zero.
Finally, our analysis offers up some crucial issues for further investigation and for policy makers
to be aware of. In particular, it would seem that the quality of public infrastructure plays an
important role in firm development. Our proxies for this characteristic are highly aggregated in
this analysis but provide strong motivation for further research in this area.
Overall, our analysis offers up a clearer picture of employment determination in the later
transition period. With the progress of privatisation, and the downsizing of state sector firms,
visible in our results, the industrial structure is clearly still evolving and one may expect
aggregate employment elasticities to increase over time. Currently Poland is experiencing high
                                                          
16 Earnings before taxes were largely insignificant.
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levels of unemployment and no net employment creation. Our results shed some light on the
micro behaviour influencing those macro indicators.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 1998-2002: 25th , 50th  and 75th  percentiles.
Category ∆Number of
employees
∆ Real
wage
∆ Real total
revenue
All companies -10.2%
-2.4%
1.3%
-4.1%
1.7%
6.1%
-9.5%
1.9%
10.1%
State firms -8.5%
-2.4%
-0.3%
-3.0%
1.7%
4.6%
-9.9%
**-0.8%
7.0%
Privatised firms -16.9%
***-4.2%
2.1%
-5.8%
1.7%
9.4%
-11.3%
†-1.2%
11.1%
De novo firms -7.4%
***1.4%
12.4%
-7.0%
1.4%
9.4%
-5.5%
***5.1%
18.6%
Companies in regions with poor
infrastructure (I-IV)
-8.6%
-2.3%
0.2%
-3.8%
1.7%
5.5%
-8.3%
1.4%
9.8%
Companies in regions with average
infrastructure (V)
-14.9%
*-3.1%
-0.2%
-4.9%
1.7%
5.6%
-11.6%
**-1.7%
7.5%
Companies in regions with best
infrastructure (VI)
-10.2%
-2.5%
2.2%
-4.4%
1.8%
7.3%
-0.8%
0.7%
10.0%
Companies with several major locations
nation-wide
-8.4%
*-0.6%
10.6%
-7.8%
1.0%
8.6%
-11.2%
†2.2%
16.9%
Notes:
(1) The numbers given in each cell are 25th , 50th  and 75th  percentiles respectively.
(2) For computational ease, percentage changes are approximated by logarithmic differences.
(3) *** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; * Significant at 0.05; †Significant at 0.1. Significance levels
relate to Pearson χ2 (continuity corrected) based on the non-parametric test on the equality of medians.
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Table 2: Own wages, outside options and ownership: 
Dependent variable: ∆ Employment Specification:
(1) (2)
Lagged dependent variable 0.283 (0.07)*** 0.216 (0.07)***
∆ Real wage -0.593 (0.05)*** -0.596 (0.06)***
∆ Real total revenue 0.308 (0.03)*** 0.435 (0.04)***
∆ Real sectoral wage 0.203 (0.21) 0.251 (0.20)
∆ Real regional wage 1.091 (0.37) ** 1.153 (0.35) ***
State ownership -0.037 (0.01)** -0.045 (0.01)***
De novo ownership 0.009 (0.02) 0.005 (0.02)
∆ Real wage * state - 0.122 (0.09)
∆ Real revenue * state - -0.366 (0.06)***
Service sector versus industry 0.002 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00)
Trade sector versus other services -0.001 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01)
Mining & heavy ind. versus other industry -0.005 (0.00)* -0.005 (0.00)*
Utilities sector versus other industry 0.008 (0.00)*** 0.008 (0.00)***
Construction sector versus other industry -0.022 (0.00)*** -0.022 (0.00)***
Engineering sector v. other manufacturing -0.008 (0.27) -0.008 (0.27)
Chemical sector v. other manufacturing -0.007 (0.01) -0.008 (0.005)
Constant -0.010 (0.02) -0.008 (0.02)
Second-order autocorrelation: z -0.52 -0.77
Sargan test: χ2 16.41 11.38
Number of firms 268 268
Number of observations 670 670
Notes:
1. Estimator: Arellano-Bond 1 step generalised method of moments.
2. *** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; *Significant at 0.05; † Significant at 0.1
3. Standard errors in parentheses. 
4. Time dummies included.
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Table 3: Asymmetry effects: 
alternative specifications for regional controls:
Dependent variable: ∆Employment (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lagged dependent variable .238 (.062)*** .240 (.061)*** .284 (.053)*** .294 (.054)*** .288 (.055)*** .277 (.056)*** .282 (.056)***
∆Real wage -.565 (.05)*** -.565 (.05)*** -.585 (.05)*** -.596 (.05)*** -.585 (.05)*** -.592 (.05)*** -.596 (.05)***
∆Real total revenue .474 (.051)*** .477 (.051)*** .477 (.053)*** .471 (.053)*** .475 (.053)*** .518 (.069)*** .463 (.045)***
∆Real sectoral wage .251 (.194)
∆Real regional wage 1.147 (.35)*** 1.219 (.35)*** 1.112 (.374)** 1.161 (.36)***
Firms in average infrastructure regions .003 (.010) -.003 (.010) -.004 (.010) -.002 (.010)
Firms in regions with best infrastructure .011 (.010) .017 (010)† .017 (.010)† .017 (.010)†
Firms with multiple locations .033 (.016)* .034 (.016)* .028 (.015)† .036 (.016)* .036 (.016)*
State ownership -.032 (.014)* -.033 (.015)* -.030 (.015)* -.032 (.015)* -.030 (.015)* -.028 (.017)† -.046 (.01)***
De novo ownership .009 (.020) .000 (.015)
∆Revenue * state -.475 (.11)*** -.463 (.11)*** -.463 (.11)*** -.463 (.11)*** -.462 (.11)*** -.508 (.12)*** -.381 (.07)***
∆Revenue * de novo -.103 (.112) -.060 (.082)
Negative ∆revenue -.084 (.092) -.081 (.092) -.082 (.095) -.070 (.096) -.082 (.094) -.121 (.118)
Negative ∆revenue * state .209 (.158) .189 (.159) .197 (.164) .192 (.166) .192 (.163) .236 (.181)
Negative ∆revenue * de novo .092 (.213)
Constant -.024 (.016) -.019 (.015) -.027 (.016)† -.020 (.016) -.022 (.016) -.024 (.018) -.015 (.016)
Second-order autocorrelation: z -.41 -.42 -.71 -.84 -.73 -.75 -.77
Sargan test: χ2 11.88 10.55 12.14 11.25 12.20 12.23 11.79
revenue  elasticity of employment:
de novo firms .403
privatised firms .463
state firms .082
revenue increase: de novo firms .415
revenue increase: privatised firms .518
revenue increase: privatised & de novo .474 .477 .477 .471 .475
revenue  increase: state firms -.001 .014 .014 .008 .013 .010
revenue decrease: de novo firms .386
revenue decrease: privatised firms .397
revenue decrease: privatised & de novo .390 .396 .395 .401 .393
revenue decrease: state firms .124 .122 .129 .130 .129 .125
Notes: (1) Estimator: Arellano-Bond 1 step generalised method of moments. (2) *** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; *Significant at 0.05; † Significant
at 0.1. (3) Number of firms: 268. Number of observations: 670. (4) Standard errors in parentheses. (5) Time and sectoral controls included but not reported, the
results were consistent with those in Table 2.
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Appendix 1: Summary of existing empirical research
Transition Economies: Central Europe
Authors Country and Time Wage elasticity Output/sales
elasticity
Other selected comments
Basu et al., (2000) Poland,1988-1991 -0.3 (1988/89)
-0.84 (1990/91)
0.2 Privatised firms create less
employment than other firms.
Grosfield and Nivet
(1997)
Poland, 1988-1994,
largest firms
-0.03 pre-transition
-0.13 transition
0.06 pre-transition
0.25 transition
Privatised firms increased employment
by 20% more than SOE’s (1990-1).
Kőllő (1998) Hungary, 1986-1993 -0.6 pre-transition
-0.3 (1992/93)
0.2 – 0.3 decreasing
0 increasing
0.2 Sales elasticity
Firm size and export status important
Estrin and Svnejar
(1998)
Poland, Czech
Republic, Slovak
Republic and Hungary
1989-93
Poland: significant
for both increasing
and decreasing, pre
and post transition.
The degree of autonomy of the firm is
not linked to elasticity of  labour
demand.
Christev and Fitzroy
(2002) 
Poland ,1994-1997 -0.08 More elastic for
decreasing sales.
Faggio and Konings
(2003)
Poland, Slovenia,
Bulgaria, Romania and
Estonia, 1993-1997
Negative effect of state ownership on
employment.
Large firms downsized faster in
advanced transition countries
Kőrősi (2002) Hungary, 1992-9 Some evidence of
asymmetry
Ownership not important for labour
demand
Rutkowski (2002) Croatia, 2000-1 No asymmetry
evidence
Productivity, capital intensity &
investment increase employment
Ownership not important for LD.
Smaller firms tend to grow faster.
continued
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Transition Economies: China, CIS
Authors Country and time Wage elasticity Output/Sales
elasticity
Selected results
Dong (1998) China, 1984-1990 Negative own wage
elasticity
Negative alternative wage elasticity
consistent with weak efficiency 
Lee (1999) China, 1980-1994 Positive output
elasticity
Profit/employees negatively affect
employment in post 1985 period .
Measures of insider power and
corporatisation are insignificant
factors.
Konings and Lehman
(2001)
Russia, 1996-1997 State owned firms employment decline
was less responsive to wage changes
than private and mixed firms.
Konings et al., (2003) Ukraine, 1998-2000 Negative relationship between firm
size and net employment growth.
New private firms show higher
employment growth.
Non-transition countries
Brown and Ashenfelter
(1986)
US, 1948-1965 Negative own wage
elasticity
Negative local unemployment
elasticity consistent with weak
efficiency in employment contracts.
Burgess (1988) U.K, 1964-82 -0.06
Card (1990) Canada, 1966-1983 -0.03 to –0.58 Weak relation between employment
and industry wage.
Haskel et al., (1997) UK, 1990 Employment
adjustment more to
positive shocks
Smolny (2002) Germany, 1980-1992 Product innovation is positively
associated with employment growth.
Checci and Navaretti
(2003)
Several EU countries -0.3 Sweden
-1.06 Spain

Appendix 2: Definition of Variables
Variable name Description of variable Details / comments
state ownership State owned firm (dummy, time variant) Contemporaneous state ownership
dummy
de_novo ownership De novo private firm (dummy, time
invariant)
A new private company, i.e. which
is neither state owned nor was ever
state owned
privatised Privatised firm (dummy, time variant) Contemporaneous privatised
dummy
employment Natural logarithm of number of employees Available for 1996-2002
real wage Natural logarithm of real wage cost Ln of (average monthly wage cost
in zlotys/consumer price index).
Data 1996, 1998-2002. CPI:
Central Statistical Office
real total revenue Natural logarithm of real total revenue17 Total revenue/CPI. Available for
1996-2002.
∆ real total revenue Change in revenue given as logarithmic
difference (the operator  ∆ has the same
meaning for other variables)
∆ revenue * state 
(de novo)
refers to the interaction of the state/de
novo dummy with the given variable (in
this example: with revenue change)
negative (positive) 
∆ revenue
Negative (positive) revenue growth, i.e. a
variable which replicates  for values of 
∆ real total revenue>0 (<0) and takes
zero in other cases 
By constructution, the variable
enables to test the differential
effect as compared with the source
variable (i.e. both ∆ real total revenue
and negative (positive) ∆ revenue
should be included in any given
specification)
negative (positive) ∆
revenue * state (de
novo)
The variable defined in the previous row
multiplied by the state (de novo) dummy
continued
                                                          
17 We also have data on sales. Sales could be a better measure, i.e. more related to outcome from operations, but the
data is less complete for that variable and correlation between sales and revenues is very close to one. Therefore, we
opt for revenues. Estimations based on sales are available on request.
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Variable name Description of variable Details / comments
Year controls 1999, 2000, 2001 dummies Four years allowed given the
GMM lag structure
Sectoral controls - services versus industry
- trade versus other services,
- mining & heavy industry versus other
industry,
- utilities versus other industry, 
- construction versus other industry,
- engineering v. other manufacturing,
- chemical v. other manufacturing 
Sectoral controls are constructed
as orthogonal contrasts. When
replaced by simple dummies, the
results do not change. However,
using orthogonal contrasts allows
the sectoral controls to be
uncorrelated with each other.
Moreover, instead of being
constructed as the difference
against one benchmark group, the
orthogonal contrasts allow
describing the structure of sectoral
differences in a more reach way.
Details of coding are available on
request.
External
characteristics
real sectoral wage Logarithm of real sectoral wages Logarithm of (average monthly
wage in zlotys/CPI). Available for
1996-2001, two digit NACE
sectors
real regional wage Logarithm of real regional wage Central Statistical Office data. At
the provincial level; 17 (new)
provinces. Annual average.
Available 1998-2001
poor infrastructure Categories I-IV of the taxonomy of public
infrastructure of Polish regions (based on
49 regions)
average
infrastructure
Category V
best infrastructure Category VI
Based directly on Duffy and Walsh
(2001), which offers detailed
description; clustering of
categories I-IV in our sample
results from the fact that there was
a small number of companies in
each of the four;
Ranking is constructed in such a
way that category VI corresponds
to best infrastructure
multiple locations Dummy for companies operating
nationwide
Companies within this category
were not assigned to any
infrastructure category. In other
words this and the previous three
categories are mutually exclusive
